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ARGUMENT
I.
SANDY CITY'S ACTIONS EXTEND WELL BEYOND THE
PROTECTIONS
OF
THE
POLICE
POWER:
MOST
IMPORTANTLY. SANDY CITY HAS FAILED TO SHOW
THAT ITS DOWNZONING OF THE SMITHS' PROPERTY
BEARS ANY RELATION TO THE HEALTH. SAFETY OR
WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITY,
In support of its actions, Sandy City attempts to invoke the
police power

afforded municipalities

as some sort of blanket

protection allowing it to take virtually any course of action,
regardless
guarantees.

of

the

effect

Although

connection with the

upon

there

landowners

or

is a presumption

constitutional
of validity

in

zoning activities of municipalities, that

presumption is not, as Sandy City appears to assert, absolute.
Here, Sandy City merely makes conclusory assertions regarding the
"public benefit" conferred by its actions, but fails to address the
facts; namely, that the means chosen do not ensure the attainment
of its asserted goals.

Consequently, Sandy City has failed to meet

the minimal requirements for successful assertion of the police
power.
Tellingly, in Call v. Citv of West Jordan. 614 P.2d 1257, 1258
(Utah 1980), which is cited by Sandy City, the court noted: "[n]o
contention is made that the county did not act within its grant of

1

powers from the legislature in its adoption of the original zoning
ordinance."

Here, that is exactly the contention made by the

Smiths; Sandy City acted well beyond its grant of powers by
enacting a change in zoning which was not in any way calculated to
address the goals asserted by Sandy City in support of such change.
In its Brief, Sandy City utterly fails to address the facts
relied upon by the Smiths.

Specifically, the downzoning of the

rear acreage of the Smiths' property from commercial to R-2-10
residential fails to meet the City's alleged goal of "preserving
the residential nature of the area" for the following reasons:
• Sandy City has asserted primarily that the residential
nature of the area may be preserved by limiting "proposed uses of
lot depths exceeding 2 00 feet" (See Brief, p. 4) .

Not only does

the depth suggestion ignore the existence of other commercial
developments along 700 East with depths that greatly exceed 200
feet, it also ignores the fact that the Sandy City Comprehensive
Plan Goals & Policies expressly recommended a policy which would
preclude the development of typical strip commercial. The 200 feet
depth suggestion limits commercial development of the Smiths'
property

to

exactly

that

sort

of

strip

development,

demonstrates Sandy City's ignorance of its own stated goals.

2

and

•

The City's second concern involves access to any future

commercial development on the rear acreage.

Such access from 700

East is clearly obtainable by simply making alterations in the
existing commercial development fronting 700 East.

Sandy City has

failed to contradict the undisputed testimony of the Smiths'
expert, who opined that access to residentialr as opposed to
commercial development on the rear acreage through the existing
development fronting 700 East is impractical and unworkable. The
City has never proposed any access plan for residential development
on the rear acreage.
• Finally, as set forth in the Sandy Community Citizens*
Report and the Sandy City Comprehensive Plan Goals & Policies
(noted at page 3 of Sandy City's Brief) Sandy City has claimed that
the "stub streets," which extend into the Smiths' rear acreage,
create traffic circulation problems, which are allegedly alleviated
by the change in zoning. However, commercial zoning, as opposed to
residential, would solve any problem of commercial traffic through
the surrounding subdivisions, since full and complete ingress and
egress would be obtained onto and from 700 East.

Sandy City has

not even attempted to show how residential zoning would alleviate
the alleged problem.

3

In sum, Sandy City has failed to do anything more than merely
assert general goals of "preservation of residential uses" in
support of its decision.

It has failed to even address the

specific problems identified by the Smiths.

In light of this

failure, Sandy City's reliance upon the allegedly far-reaching
police power afforded municipalities is unavailing.

The Smiths do

not, as Sandy City asserts, claim that strict construction of
municipal

actions

is the rule.

However,

it

is absolutely

undisputed that a municipality's actions will not be upheld absent
some reasonable relation to health, safety, and welfare of the
public.

In fact, in the very case cited by Sandy City, State v.

Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980), the court noted that county
ordinances must "rationally promote the public health, safety,
morals and welfare . . . ." Id. at 1127.
Sandy City has failed to make such a showing.

It has done

nothing more than make conclusory statements of its purposes, and
has failed to

(1) address the Smiths' concerns regarding the

problems created by the zoning; and

(2) demonstrate how the

downzoning implements the City's stated goal.

Consequently, Sandy

City has failed to make the minimum showing necessary to sustain
its actions under fundamental due process standards.

4

II.
SANDY CITY'S DOWNZONING OF THE SMITHS' REAR
ACREAGE
DEPRIVES
THE
SMITHS
OF
MX
ECONOMICALLY REASONABLE USE OF THE PROPERTY:
CONSEQUENTLY,
SUCH ACTION
CONSTITUTES A
COMPENSABLE TAKING.
In its Brief, Sandy City attempts to characterize this area of
the law as one that is stable and well-established.

In fact,

constitutional takings analyses, both on a state and federal level,
are in a significant state of flux.

This case presents the ideal

vehicle for demonstration of the difficulties posed by the case law
cited by Sandy City.

Most importantly, Sandy City's position

allows it, with the benefit only of vague pronouncements regarding
preservation of residential uses, to deprive a private landowner of
reasonable, viable use of its land, and impose a diminution in
value which is nothing short of devastating.

Such a result should

not be countenanced and must be rejected.
A.

THE SMITHS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO SEEK REVIEW OF THE
ORDINANCE IN ORDER TO RAISE A FACIAL CHALLENGE;
CONSEQUENTLY, THEIR CLAIMS ARE RIPE FOR REVIEW.

Sandy City now attempts to resurrect its "ripeness" argument
which was impliedly rejected by the trial court.

At any rate,

Sandy City's ripeness argument is utterly lacking in merit; where
a facial constitutional issue is raised, as the Smiths have done,
final review is not required.

5

Sandy City argues that the Smiths' takings claim is not "ripe"
because they did not apply for development approval, despite the
fact that the property had been zoned R-2-10, and commercial
development, which is not permitted in such a zone, was and is the
only feasible development option.

Sandy City raised this argument

in its summary judgment briefing before the trial court. Although
the trial court's Memorandum Decision did not explicitly discuss
that argument, the ripeness defense was impliedly rejected, as
evidenced by the fact that the trial court reached the merits of
the Smiths' takings claim.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Sandy City's ripeness argument
has not already been rejected, it is unavailing.

The Smiths have

raised a facial challenge to the zoning ordinance, for which final
review, including a request for development approval, is not
required.
The Smiths have maintained throughout the course of this
litigation that the ordinance is facially unconstitutional because
it results in an uncompensated taking of their property and because
it does not correct a public evil, while creating an undue burden
for the Smiths.

Because of this facial challenge, the Smiths are

not required to seek a final decision regarding the applicability
of the zoning ordinance.

Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998

6

F.2d 680, 686 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that "final decision" hurdle
of Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City1. 473 U.S. 172

(1985) does not apply to facial

challenges)•
Furthermore, the futility of seeking development approval is
apparent. Requiring the owner of property that has been downzoned
to seek rezoning as a form of administrative remedy for the
downzoning is nonsensical. The Smiths believe that Sandy City was
serious when it downzoned the property and would not rezone it to
commercial simply because the Smiths request that they do so.
Nothing in the relationship between the Smiths and Sandy City
suggests otherwise. Substantial authority has held that a property
owner need not exhaust remedies by seeking permits, etc., if such
actions would be futile. Hoehne v. County of San Benitof 870 F.2d
529

(9th Cir.

1989)

(where the defendants

argued

that the

plaintifffs claim was not ripe because they could have sought a
variance, a conditional use plan, or applied for a favorable
rezoning, the court held that such action would have been futile
where a "final decision" regarding acceptable uses of the property
appeared to have been reached) ; Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm
Desert, 998 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that Williamson does
1

Cited by Sandy City at page 18 of their Brief.
7

not require plaintiff to seek remedies in state court where it
would be futile to do so).
B.

SANDY CITY'S DOWNZONING HAS DEPRIVED THE SMITHS OF ALL
ECONOMICALLY REASONABLE USES OF THEIR PROPERTY;
CONSEQUENTLY, IT CONSTITUTES A COMPENSABLE TAKING.

At the heart of Sandy City's argument is a hard-and-fast
construction of the deprivation of all economically viable use
rule.

However, Sandy City portrays the case law in this area as

being much more settled and well-established than reality would
suggest.

To accept Sandy City's construction of the case law, one

must accept the proposition that the City has absolutely no
constitutional

duty

to

compensate

the

Smiths,

despite

the

following:
• Sandy City's downzoning reduced the value of the rear
acreage by over $500,000.00, due to the fact that the highest and
best use of the Smiths1 property is commercial.
•
Smiths,

Residential development, the option remaining to the
is not

economically

warranted; the

rear

acreage is

surrounded by existing subdivisions which range in age from 30 to
35 years which contain older, deteriorating low-end housing. The
construction of new homes in the midst of the existing development
makes no viable economic sense.

8

•

A rental community on the rear acreage would likely cause

significant

ingress and egress problems and would result in

substantial traffic through the existing subdivision streets with
all of the attendant safety problems.
These problems demonstrate the difficulty with the application
of the deprivation of all economically viable use rule as it is
advocated by Sandy City. The Smiths have effectively been deprived
of the economically viable use of their property.

The mere fact

that some possibility for unprofitable, non-viable residential
development remains should not allow Sandy City to effect a
virtually complete deprivation without compensation.
The problem posed in this case is exactly the problem which
federal and state courts have been struggling with in a number of
recent decisions.

Contrary to the assertions of Sandy City, the

United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled upon the issue of
whether a partial or complete loss of economic use is sufficient to
constitute a taking.

The Court discussed both approaches in Lucas

v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).

See

Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. U.S., 28 F.3d 1171, 1180 (Fed.Cir.
1994) .
The fact that the law is currently in a state of flux over the
extent of deprivation necessary to effect a compensable taking is

9

demonstrated by several recent federal court decisions in which it
was held

that a taking occurred

remained2.

even

if some economic use

See Loveladies Harbor. Inc. v. U.S., 28 F.3d 1171

(Fed.Cir. 1994)(denial of a fill permit which was necessary to
complete an ongoing real estate development constituted a taking
where the fair market value of the parcel prior to permit denial
was $2,658,000, and $12,500 after denial); Bowles v. U.S.. 31
Fed.CI.

37

(1994)

(denial

of

fill

permit

which

rendered

construction of single-family residences, the only economically
viable use of the property, impossible was a taking) ; Kempf v. City
of Iowa Cityf 402 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1987) (where zoning change
decreased

value

of

property

from

$200,000

to

$52,000.00,

compensable taking occurred).
Sandy City's attempt to distinguish these cases on the basis
that the Smiths' land is presently undeveloped is unavailing.
fact,

the

Smiths

have

instituted

and

maintained

In

commercial

development on the front portion of the property which abuts 700
East. The long-term goal of the Smiths has always been to initiate

2

A more reasonable, less restrictive view of the economic
use rule is particularly apt in light of Article I, Section 22 of
the Utah Constitution, which allows compensation for private
property which is not only taken, but damaged for public use. It
is difficult to imagine a clearer-cut case of damage than the
present set of facts.
10

commercial development on the rear acreage as well, a fact which is
undisputed

by

Sandy

investment-backed

City,

Consideration

expectations,

which

of these

Sandy

City

long-term,

has

utterly

ignored, is not only a factor, it is mandated by the Lucas decison.
III.
SANDY CITY ACTED OUTSIDE OF THE POLICE POWER
IN BARRICADING 1055/1075 EAST STREET AND
SUBSTANTIAL? IMPAIRED TgE SMITHS' RIGHT TO
ACCESS THEIR PROPERTY.
Sandy City attempts to legitimize its conduct by setting forth
unsubstantiated, vague objectives.

The real problem with Sandy

City's argument is that it utterly fails to recognize the fact that
the Smiths' right to access their property has been substantially
impaired by the barricade erected by Sandy City and, as such, the
Smiths are entitled to compensation.
Sandy City placed a barricade at the border of the Smiths'
property as it abuts 1055/1075 East Street.
through an adjoining subdivision.

The street runs

In support of its action, Sandy

City relies upon vague pronouncements concerning dust and police
enforcement of driving violations on the Smiths' property.

In

fact, Sandy City has failed to overcome two crucial facts: (1) the
Smiths' right to access this significant-size parcel has been
substantially

damaged

and;

dedicated to public use.

(2)

the

roadway

in

question

was

In light of these two concerns, Sandy
11

City's reliance upon the police power is unavailing.
the

position

asserted

unconstitutional
reviewable.

by

Sandy

City,

actions of governmental

the

Contrary to

arbitrary

entities

or

are indeed

State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 1980)

(courts will review local decisions which are "arbitrary, or [are]
directly prohibited by . . .the state or federal laws or the
constitution of this state or of the United States").
Here, Sandy City's barricade is not only unsupported by
sufficient

rationale,

it

is

directly

specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89.

contrary

to

statute;

Sandy City attempts to

avoid application of the statute by claiming that the Smiths never
received an adjudication by clear and convincing evidence that the
road had in fact been dedicated to the public.

In fact, this

requirement is imposed to protect the rights of private landowners.
Where, as here, the landowner is asserting the application of the
statute

such

an

adjudication

is not required

or necessary.

Furthermore, even if an adjudication were necessary, the trial
court was requested to make it.
CONCLUSION
Sandy City has continually failed to address the concerns
raised Dy the Smiths, which demonstrate that residential zoning in
this area does not meet due process requirements; specifically, it
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does not rationally promote the public health, safety, morals and
welfare.

This is particularly true since Sandy City has failed to

demonstrate how residential zoning implements its stated goals, in
light of the concerns raised by the Smiths; namely, access concerns
and Sandy City's own stated goal of reducing strip commercial
development.
However, it is Sandy City's conduct with respect to the
takings claim that presents the real difficulty.

Sandy City

attempts to argue that a reduction in value of approximately
$500,000.00, caused by a single swipe of the pen by Sandy City, is
inconsequential.

The City's downzoning has left the Smith's with

one development option; residential.

Residential development is

plainly unsuitable and nothing short of economically disastrous in
this area.
takings

It is exactly because of this type of problem that

analyses

has

been

undergoing

significant

evolution.

Allowing Sandy City to effect unconstitutional down zoning with no
accompanying requirement of compensation is exactly the municipal
conduct addressed by federal and state takings provisions, and
should not be countenanced.
Finally, Sandy City's barricade of 1055/1075 East Street is
unsupported by any valid exercise of the policy power, particularly
in light of the vague assertions of purpose enunciated by Sandy
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City and the fact that the street was dedicated to public use.
Consequently, the trial court's entry of summary judgment on these
issues should be reversed, the case remanded and the Smiths awarded
their costs.
DATED: October 10, 1997.

C_O£ARK W.

SE

KRISTINE EDDE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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